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2When I took over as editor-in-chief from Terry Copp in 2006, 
we quickly agreed that we would 
like to see fuller coverage of the Cold 
War in the journal. That was not the 
only reason why I was particularly 
pleased to receive the articles 
presented in this issue on two leading 
Canadian ﬁgures, Omond Solandt, 
the founding head of the Defence 
Research Board, and General Charles 
Foulkes, chairman of the chiefs of 
staff committee. Both articles present 
new archival research on important 
but little known stories, and both 
authors are young scholars; Jason 
Ridler recently completed his Ph.D. at 
the Royal Military College of Canada, 
and Michael Manulak is a student 
at Carleton University’s Norman 
Paterson School of International 
Affairs.
 Solandt, although a Canadian, 
played a  leading part  in  the 
development of operational research 
in the British Army during the 
Second World War, as Jason relates 
in his article. By pure coincidence, 
Terry provided us with a preliminary 
report produced under Solandt’s 
supervision that endeavours to 
quantify salient features of attack and 
defence on each of the ﬁve beaches in 
Normandy assaulted by Allied forces 
on D-Day.
 I continue to be impressed – and 
moved – by new work that brings 
to life the human dimension of the 
First World War. Distant as the 
First World War may seem, work 
at this level of detail in personal 
records has only become possible 
in recent decades, as the archives 
have opened personnel files, and 
the families of veterans have turned 
personal letters over to research 
institutions. In the present issue, Pat 
Brennan of the University of Calgary 
presents another of his path-breaking 
studies on leadership in the Canadian 
Corps, in this case senior officers 
who had to leave the Western Front 
because of the cumulative strain of 
months and years in command. Eric 
Brown and Tim Cook have distilled 
a large collection of letters from two 
brothers, both of whom entered 
the Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air 
Force during the last part of the war. 
The family donated this valuable 
collection to the Canadian War 
Museum and Eric and Tim’s article 
is part of continuing efforts to make 
the museum’s holdings more widely 
known and accessible.
 During the mid-1980s, Bruce 
Ellis, who was then curator of the 
The Army Museum in Halifax, 
and I collaborated on a history 
of Connaught Battery, one of the 
least well known historic harbour 
fortiﬁcations in that city. The piece 
appeared in the Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4 (spring 1986), 
pp. 29-33. I realized with a jolt a few 
months ago that that was nearly a 
quarter century ago, and offered the 
piece for possible reprint to Mike 
Bechthold. Mike took up the offer, 
but for a particular reason, I suspect. 
The inspiration for the original 
piece was Bruce’s discovery of a 
dozen photographs taken during the 
construction of the battery during the 
First World War. CDQ had space to 
publish only three of these shots, and 
Mike jumped at the opportunity to 
present additional images from the 
collection. In a future issue, Bruce and 
I will recount how we learned of the 
story of Connaught Battery, present 
some additional photographs of the 
site, and bring developments at the 
site up to date.
Roger Sarty
May 2009 
From the
Editor-in-Chief
The editors of Canadian Military History wish to thank the following people and 
organizations for their contributions to this issue:
Harold Averill, Maggie Arbour-Doucette, Geoff Keelan, Kellen Kurschinski, Vanessa 
McMackin, John Parry, Kathryn Rose, Susan Ross, Matt Symes, Andrew Thomson, 
Jane Whalen.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre; Canadian War Museum; Directorate of 
History & Heritage, Department of National Defence; Essex and Kent Scottish 
Regiment; Security and Defence Forum, Department of National Defence; University 
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Dear Sir,
I am in full agreement with Dr. Granatstein’s argument that the Canadian military 
has since 1940 started to gravitate from 
its British military culture to that of the 
United States (“From Mother Country to 
Far Away Relative: The Canadian-British 
Military Relationship from 1945,” Winter 
2009). What I do not agree with are some 
of his examples. Comparing the Second 
World War uniforms and equipment that 
Canada used to those of the United States 
or even the Germans is a favourite past-
time of many interested in military matters. 
For the uninitiated and those who have 
no experience with the actual garments 
and individual pieces, it is easy to draw 
quick conclusions from comments made 
by soldiers or from observing photographs. 
By actually studying the individual pieces, 
referencing to period design, manufacture 
and distribution documents, and by looking 
at the lineage of each piece, much like 
entomologists do with insects, a much more 
accurate appreciation of military equipment 
can be made.
 For instance, Dr. Granatstein mentions 
that the steel helmet (it is actually called a 
Mk II Helmet) that the British and Canadians 
used in the Second World War offered 
no cover for the back of the neck (true), it 
weighed a ton (not true, it weighed 1 kg) 
and that it was so awkward it was almost 
impossible to run while wearing it (partially 
true). Dr. Granatstein ﬁnally administers a 
historian’s ”coup de grâce” by stating that 
“No Canadian wept when the helmet was 
scrapped in the late-1950s.” Actually the Mk 
II saw service with the Canadian Army and 
Royal Canadian Navy until 1970.
 The Mk II was a modernized Mk I 
helmet that was first introduced by the 
British in 1916. The Mk I had a bowl-like 
design in order to protect soldiers in 
trenches from indirect, overhead ﬁre and 
did not provide ballistic protection to 
the side and back of the head. The Mk II 
Helmet was introduced in 1936 and used a 
redesigned liner and chinstrap. In defence 
of the British, the army knew about the 
deﬁciencies in the design and was working 
on a newer model of helmet that provided 
better all-around ballistic protection to the 
head. In 1943 the new Mk III Helmet was 
issued to the British and Canadian assault 
formations for the Normandy invasion. 
Unfortunately the Mk III Helmet was never 
adopted by the Canadian Army and the 
Mk II was the standard helmet until 1960 
when its replacement was began with the 
US M1 which had been deemed the “NATO 
Standard.”
 If we briefly look at some of the 
characteristics of the helmets mentioned 
in Dr. Granatstein’s article, we see that the 
Mk II weighed approximately 1 kg, the M1 
weighed approximately 1.1 kg, so the US M1 
was a heavier helmet. The British and the 
Canadians wanted to adopt the M1 Helmet 
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I am in full agreement with Dr. Granatstein’s argument that the Canadian military 
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of his examples. Comparing the Second 
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Canada used to those of the United States 
or even the Germans is a favourite past-
time of many interested in military matters. 
For the uninitiated and those who have 
no experience with the actual garments 
and individual pieces, it is easy to draw 
quick conclusions from comments made 
by soldiers or from observing photographs. 
By actually studying the individual pieces, 
referencing to period design, manufacture 
and distribution documents, and by looking 
at the lineage of each piece, much like 
entomologists do with insects, a much more 
accurate appreciation of military equipment 
can be made.
 For instance, Dr. Granatstein mentions 
that the steel helmet (it is actually called a 
Mk II Helmet) that the British and Canadians 
used in the Second World War offered 
no cover for the back of the neck (true), it 
weighed a ton (not true, it weighed 1 kg) 
and that it was so awkward it was almost 
impossible to run while wearing it (partially 
true). Dr. Granatstein ﬁnally administers a 
historian’s ”coup de grâce” by stating that 
“No Canadian wept when the helmet was 
scrapped in the late-1950s.” Actually the Mk 
II saw service with the Canadian Army and 
Royal Canadian Navy until 1970.
 The Mk II was a modernized Mk I 
helmet that was first introduced by the 
British in 1916. The Mk I had a bowl-like 
design in order to protect soldiers in 
trenches from indirect, overhead ﬁre and 
did not provide ballistic protection to 
the side and back of the head. The Mk II 
Helmet was introduced in 1936 and used a 
redesigned liner and chinstrap. In defence 
of the British, the army knew about the 
deﬁciencies in the design and was working 
on a newer model of helmet that provided 
better all-around ballistic protection to the 
head. In 1943 the new Mk III Helmet was 
issued to the British and Canadian assault 
formations for the Normandy invasion. 
Unfortunately the Mk III Helmet was never 
adopted by the Canadian Army and the 
Mk II was the standard helmet until 1960 
when its replacement was began with the 
US M1 which had been deemed the “NATO 
Standard.”
 If we briefly look at some of the 
characteristics of the helmets mentioned 
in Dr. Granatstein’s article, we see that the 
Mk II weighed approximately 1 kg, the M1 
weighed approximately 1.1 kg, so the US M1 
was a heavier helmet. The British and the 
Canadians wanted to adopt the M1 Helmet 
for standard issue, but because British radio 
headsets could not be worn under the M1, 
this plan was scrapped but only after Canada 
had purchased 250,000 M1 Helmets in 1943, 
some of which were eventually issued in 
1960. The M1 Helmet was introduced in 1941 
replacing the M1917A1 Helmet that was a US 
modiﬁcation of the British Mk I.
 Every problem that Dr. Granatstein 
documents for the Mk II Helmet was also 
reported by the US Army about the M1. 
It was too heavy, difﬁcult to wear when 
running, too noisy in conﬁned areas and 
yes, there was even not enough ballistic 
protection for the neck and side of the head. 
Actually the best helmet design was the one 
that the Germans developed during the 
Great War, the M1916, and improved upon 
during the Second World War starting with 
the M1935. The German “Stahlhelm” had the 
best overall ballistic protection for the head 
and weighed 1.2 kg; in fact it was such a good 
design that when the US military started 
replacing their stocks of M1 Helmets in the 
late 1970s, the new helmet design ended up 
being similar to that of the German wartime 
helmets. The new helmet was the PASGT 
(Personal Armor System Ground Troops), it 
was manufactured of Kevlar instead of steel, 
it weighted just over 1.2 kg (a little heavier 
than the M1), it had a similar ballistic shape 
as the older German helmets and it had a 
revised chin-strap. The PASGT was used by 
the Canadian Forces during the 1990s until 
the French-designed CG634 was adopted in 
the late 1990s. The CG634 is now the current 
CF Helmet, it is manufactured of Kevlar, like 
all modern helmets, the shape is similar to 
the PASGT and the older German helmets, 
it also has a three-point chin-strap. It weighs 
1.4 kg and is quite a bit heavier than the Mk 
II which Dr. Granatstein stated was not very 
good because of the weight.
 Dr. Granatstein stated that “American 
equipment too was increasingly coveted. 
Sometimes this was because US equipment 
was both more comfortable to wear, better 
designed for protection and simply more 
effective than the Second World War pattern 
British material used by the Canadian 
forces.” This like the above helmet statement 
is very general and it is easy to come to these 
conclusions when comparing Canadian/
British to American without knowing the 
speciﬁc details.
 When developing ﬁeld uniforms, both 
the British and the Americans employed 
a system that involved wearing multiple 
layers of clothing. Uniforms were designed 
for certain climatic regions and if we look at 
British battledress (BD), it was an all-wool 
garment consisting of a short tunic and long 
trousers that were joined by buttons at the 
waist (admittedly the button system never 
worked right). This uniform was designed 
to be worn year-round in the UK and 
Northwest Europe and when developed in 
1936-37 was a stylish, comfortable, modern, 
and extremely durable field uniform. It 
was, in fact, so modern and stylish that it 
was copied by both the Americans (M1944 
Wool Field Jacket) and the Germans (M44 
Field Blouse) and was the staple uniform 
design by many armies until the early 1960s. 
British BD was designed at a time when 
US and German soldiers were wearing 
unforms designed during the Great War. 
The Americans susequently dedicated vast 
amounts of money and resources to clothing 
designs that employed more cotton and less 
wool such as the M1943 Field Jacket, but 
even on the grand scale that US material 
was manufactured and issued, the US Army 
still could not fully re-equip before the end 
of the Second World War and many of the 
1940s woollen uniforms slogged it out with 
the Americans and their Allies through the 
Korean War and into the early 1960s.
 Sure,  these new designs by the 
Americans were nice, but both Britain and 
Canada were also producing newer ﬁeld 
uniforms. By 1943 the British had a new 
series of uniforms and equipment designed 
for the war in the East against the Japanese. 
The winter and bush clothing developed 
by Canada in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
evolved into the very modern combat and 
winter clothing employed by the Canadian 
military in the 1960s and the ﬁeld uniforms 
worn today.
 Just to show how problematic it is to 
develop and issue new combat uniforms 
on time and to the people who need them, 
back when the Canadian military deployed 
to Afghanistan in 2002 there were several 
reports that the Canadians were perhaps 
improperly issued with Canadian Disruptive 
Pattern Temperate Region (CADPAT TR) 
uniforms instead of desert or CADPAT Arid 
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4Region (CADPAT AR) clothing. In the 1990s 
Canada had been trialling desert versions of 
its current uniform but by 2001 had scrapped 
the remaining stores of this uniform in 
favour of the soon-to-be-produced CADPAT 
AR uniform. CADPAT TR was just coming 
into universal use by the CF in 2002 and the 
issue of the arid version had to be sped up 
in order to meet operational demands.
 The same holds true with the staple 
British web equipment of the Second World 
War, the 1937 Pattern. Again, designed just 
prior to the war as a replacement for the 1908 
Pattern web, this set still employed highly 
durable tightly woven cotton web as its 
construction material. The new design was 
an attempt to address problems encountered 
with the 1908 Pattern and to accommodate 
newer infantry weapons being introduced 
at the time, namely the 30-round magazine 
of the Bren light machine gun. A pair of 
generously cut basic pouches were issued 
to each soldier so that he could carry Bren 
magazines and the concept of 1937 Pattern 
Web was that required web pieces could 
easily be added or removed from the 
common waistbelt and braces.
 The Americans also used cotton web for 
their ﬁeld equipment although they took a 
different approach and issued a specialized 
belt according to the weapon used by the 
soldier. From this individual web item, 
pieces could easily be added or removed. 
So, within a British infantry section, each 
person has the same waistbelt with the same 
basic pouches to carry ammunition and 
magazines. An American infantry squad 
employed three separate belts, the M1936 
pistol belt for the squad leader, the M1923 
dismounted cartridge belt for each riﬂeman 
and the M1937 BAR belt for the Browning 
Automatic Riﬂe Gunner. This lavish use of 
resources may have worked for the US, but 
in the UK one belt had to work for all.
 US ﬁeld equipment did score full marks 
for the design of the water bottle (M1942 
canteen in US parlance), messtins (M1942 
meat can) and perhaps eating utensils, but 
even the US was not immune from copying 
a good design when they started replacing 
their M1910 entrenching shovel with the 
M1943 folding entrenching shovel which 
was a near perfect copy of the German 
“Klappspaten” folding entrenching spade. 
By 1943, the British had developed a 
combination KFS (Knife, Fork and Spoon) 
set for the war in the jungle and Canada 
had followed suit manufacturing this 
improved item although too late for issue 
during the Second World War. By 1952 
Canada had developed a very successful 
KFS combination that is still in use today.
 Soldiers are humans and coveting other 
equipment still happens even within the 
well-equipped CF of today. Using the “envy 
factor” to dismiss or grade equipment can 
be a dangerous approach to take without 
knowing the background facts about each 
item. During the Second World War, US 
soldiers coveted British BD tunics and 
British troops coveted US M1941 ﬁeld jackets 
because each thought the other’s garment 
was better looking.
 I will not dispute that much old clothing 
and equipment designs were retained and 
issued by the Canadian military long after 
their usefulness and this is a common trait 
with just about any large military force. The 
post-1945 Canadian Army was a victim of its 
wartime success. The small peace-time army 
had more stuff then it could ever use and it 
was easy to store it for issue when required. 
With warehouses brimming with surplus 
material, it was inevitable that this old, and 
at times obsolete, kit would continue to be 
issued into the early 1970s. British army 
experience in the early 1980s really brought 
to light the problem of saving old uniforms 
and equipment. During the Falkland Islands 
War in 1982, the British Army found that all 
of the 1940s and 1950s vintage winter clothing 
was not up to the demands and rigors of 
1980s ground warfare. These revelations 
lead to a clearing of all “war stocks” of old 
uniforms and equipment throughout the UK 
that lasted into the early 1990s. Thankfully 
by the time the 1980s had rolled around 
Canada’s stockpile of Second War clothing 
and equipment had for the most part been 
used up or sold off. Remember as well that 
the US military had the same problem and 
that even by the early 1970s many reserve 
units were still being issued 1940s vintage 
clothing and equipment.
 When it comes to “broad-brush” 
statements, two really caught my attention 
relating to Canadian UN operations. The 
ﬁrst concerned how peacekeeping had crept 
into not only the nation’s psyche but also the 
government’s: “The attitude also affected 
the soldiers who came to think that they 
were not meant to ﬁght.” I hope that this 
statement is not implying that the Canadian 
army as a whole started to consider itself 
as a blue beret peacekeeping force, for this 
is far from the truth. Good soldiers make 
good peacekeepers, but those only trained 
in peacekeeping do not make good soldiers. 
Canadian soldiers trained for combat ﬁrst 
which made them good peacekeepers as 
well.
 The other statement concerned the 
Canadian battalions being referred to by the 
British as “Can’t Bats” in reference to how 
the Canadian Forces conducted operations 
in The Former Yugoslavia under the UN 
banner from 1991 until 1995. Canadian 
UN operations in The Former Yugoslavia 
never profited from the media attention 
that we now see in coverage of Canadian 
operations in Afghanistan. For the most 
part the Canadian media stayed away from 
the Balkans. Distasteful events unfolding 
in Somalia in the early 1990s also tended to 
deﬂect media and public interest from the 
Balkans and today it is easy to cast a negative 
shadow over the whole mission. This does a 
disservice not only to those members of the 
CF who served with the UN in The Former 
Yugoslavia but also to the 11 Canadians who 
were killed there under the UN ﬂag.
 To set the record straight, the Canadian 
battalions or Canbats in The Former 
Yugoslavia were some of the best equipped 
and trained UN soldiers in the region. 
Initially the Canbats had been supplied 
directly from 4 Canadian Mechanized 
Brigade Group in Germany and were well 
equipped not only with diverse small 
arms and heavy weapons but also with an 
extensive array of armour from Cougar 
AVGPs to M113A2 Armoured Personnel 
Carriers and their assorted variants including 
anti-tank TOW Under Armour to Leopard-
based Armoured Engineer Vehicles. In The 
Former Yugoslavia the Canadians enjoyed 
a celebrity status from being able to ﬁeld so 
much heavy equipment and when required 
assisted other less fortunate UN contingents 
with parts, a status usually enjoyed by 
the Americans. The Canadians were well 
trained, motivated, highly professional and 
could count on experience from other UN 
missions, primarily Cyprus. The Canadians, 
along with the British, firmly handled 
relations with the Warring Factions and 
much to the chagrin of the local warlords 
had the tightest control of their sectors. 
The British and the Canadians were used 
to working together, knew their Rules of 
Engagement (ROEs) and could match the 
Warring Factions man for man in toughness 
and bravado bringing relative stability to the 
areas in which they operated.
 In Canada each brigade and in fact 
each regiment has its own personality and 
unfortunately at times the personality of 
one regiment or battalion could lack the 
perceived professionalism and intensity of 
operations as a regiment or battalion that 
served before it. The change of operating 
ethos was very apparent between two 
such Canadian battalions in The Former 
Yugoslavia with the replacement unit 
appearing less operationally focused than 
its predecessor. The British picked up on 
this difference and soon, in true British 
fashion, coined a name that rhymed with 
the battalion’s name. It was not “Can’t Bat” 
but it was similar. The name stuck only to 
that speciﬁc battalion and did not, to my 
knowledge, ever apply as a general term for 
Canadian units in The Former Yugoslavia. 
To quote Dr. Granatstein, “That is a fact.”
 I agree with Dr. Granatstein’s thesis that 
the Canadian military is gravitating more 
towards our neighbour to the south, but I 
disagree with the sweeping, simplistic and 
inaccurate evidence that he uses to prove his 
argument.
Ed Storey,
Nepean, ON
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